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PROFESSOR ISRAEL, THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE, AND THE 
LESSONS OF HISTORY 
RONALD J. ALLEN* 
I am both honored and pleased to be asked to comment on Professor Jerold 
Israel’s Childress Lecture.  Professor Israel’s contributions to the field of 
criminal procedure are both legion and legendary, and they all possess the 
same attributes.  His work is remarkably erudite.  As demonstrated by his 
lecture on the Supreme Court’s treatment of the due process clause in criminal 
cases, he always knows his subject matter intimately and is a model for the rest 
of us—as difficult for the rest of us as that may be.  Indeed, I very much doubt 
that we will see his command of this subject matter ever duplicated in an 
American law school; it will be approached only by later historians interested 
in the Supreme Court’s criminal due process jurisprudence who will use 
Professor Israel’s article as the foundation for their work.  He is careful, a 
complement surely of his erudition.  He knows of what he speaks, and thus 
does not misspeak. He is clear, logical and orderly.  He undertakes important 
tasks with real world consequences.  While his peers engaged in highly 
publicized but largely rhetorical, and even more largely inconsequential, 
debates over the Warren Court legacy, Professor Israel was authoring 
important and useful treatises, rewriting substantive criminal codes, and 
making major contributions to the Uniform Code of Criminal Procedure. 
In my judgment, Professor Israel is criminal law and procedure’s answer to 
the great systematizers of the generations preceding him, people like Wigmore 
in Evidence, Corbin in Contracts, Prosser in Torts.  He has worked tirelessly to 
organize, rationalize and improve the fields of law within his interests.  Thus, 
another consistent trait of his work, when he writes, he writes to make a point, 
whether to demonstrate a matter of institutional competence, such as the ways 
in which the Supreme Court handles overruling in the remarkably creative 
article published early in his career,1 or to lay the ground work for the 
rationalization of a criminal code.2 
 
* John Henry Wigmore Professor, Northwestern University School of Law. 
 1. See generally Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The “Art” of Overruling, 1963 
SUP. CT. REV. 211 (1963). 
 2. See generally Jerold H. Israel, The Process of Penal Law Reform—A Look at the 
Proposed Michigan Revised Criminal Code, 14 WAYNE L. REV. 772 (1968). 
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Except this time.  In a striking departure from his entire previous corpus, 
Professor Israel’s objective in this article is not to make a point; rather, it is 
simply to catalogue the Court’s criminal due process cases, as he states 
explicitly: “I hope to . . . provid[e] a fairly complete history of the Court’s 
development and application of interpretive guidelines for determining the 
content of free-standing due process,” in order to provide “a springboard for 
further exploration of the appropriate role of free-standing due process in the 
constitutional regulation of due process.”3  Obviously, I suspect that Professor 
Israel has with great precision identified precisely one of the contributions he 
has made, and it is an estimable one, although I am not entirely convinced that 
Professor Israel agrees.  I wonder because the last section of his paper is 
entitled, “The Lessons of History.”  History and the Lessons of History are two 
quite different things as Professor Israel conceives them, and he explicitly 
pursues the former at the expense of the latter when he apologizes for 
presenting “such a narrow history, ignoring the personalities and the political 
and societal developments that contributed to shaping these [due process] 
guidelines.”  Professor Israel at first tells us that he is going to lay out the facts, 
pure and simple, and leave their interpretation and normative implications to 
others.  But then, why close with the Lessons of History, precisely what the 
introductory remarks appear to disclaim as the objective of the inquiry? 
The Lessons of History would be the point of a History, of course, and as I 
said previously, Professor Israel always writes with a point in mind.  So 
perhaps the disclaimer is not to be taken seriously.  No one would amass and 
present the fruits of such astonishing learning and forego the opportunity to 
tease out its lessons, and especially not a mature scholar looking back on a 
lifetime of productive engagement with his or her chosen area. 
But now another puzzle arises.  While the history is robust, the Lessons of 
History are quite thin.  They are comprised of (1) a reiteration that opinions of 
the Court contain unexplained departures from positions stated by the justices 
in previous opinions; (2) the observation that opinions deploy ambiguous 
“guidelines” for interpretive use, such as “history,” which could refer to any 
time from the Magna Carta to yesterday; and (3) an assertion that the justices 
must have known full well what they were doing, as the same ones often were 
involved in both the previous and the present decision.4 
Professor Israel is aware of this puzzle: 
The failure to answer such questions may be the product of an inability to 
muster a majority for a single position.  More likely, however, that failure 
reflects the view that the guidelines better serve the institutional needs of the 
Court by not answering such questions . . . . The task of formulating guidelines 
 
 3. Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The Supreme 
Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303 (2001). 
 4. Id. at 427-32 (discussing “The Lessons of History”). 
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for applying due process to the criminal justice process appears to be viewed 
as directed more at setting a tone than giving detailed direction.  Scholars may 
desire to draw significant meaning from every different shading of language, 
but that has not been the history of the Court’s own reading of its language.  It 
has utilized standards stated with sufficient breadth and with sufficient shading 
of outlook as to accommodate major shifts in approach as changes in the 
Court’s composition produces major shifts in the majority’s viewpoints.  This 
has allowed the Court to adhere, for example, to Hurtado’s initial definition of 
fundamental rights for almost 120 years while modifying from one generation 
to the next the role of the independent content of due process.5 
Yet another puzzle—Professor Israel, while seeing the potential benefits of 
the Court’s failure to articulate or be bound by detailed expressions of the 
meaning of due process, thinks it would be “refreshing” and “perhaps even 
helpful” were the Court to bite the bullet, as it were, and tell us what the then 
existing majority viewed as “the guidelines we will utilize in determining what 
constitutes a denial of fundamental fairness.”6  On second thought, perhaps this 
is really not a puzzle at all; perhaps it is precisely what it purports to be: 
Professor Israel has accurately described his observations of the Court’s work 
product, and is expressing both his discontent with it and suggesting the 
outlines of a better approach. 
But, there remains a puzzle even on this interpretation of Professor Israel’s 
position.  The opinion that Professor Israel outlines, which he hopes the Court 
will someday surprise us with, is completely devoid of substance.  It is simply 
a prelude to the Court’s majority announcing its then current view of the 
proper scope of the due process clause, although without any promise of 
longevity.  Moreover, Professor Israel’s article contains not a hint at what he 
thinks the proper scope is.  Are we then to infer that it just does not matter 
what the content is, and that any substantive account will do?  Is the point 
simply to provide some temporary clarity rather than to get the matter right?  
Indeed, are we to think that there is not a “right” and “wrong” approach to due 
process, and that the only hope is for some short-lived clarification?  Or is the 
point that, even if there is a right and wrong to due process, whatever the value 
of getting the matter right is outweighed by settling the matter for the moment? 
But now, the final puzzle.  Hasn’t the Court done many times over 
precisely what Professor Israel proposes?  Isn’t one of the important messages 
of this distinguished scholar as he reflects on a lifetime of engagement with the 
Court’s criminal jurisprudence that there is virtually no evidence that one 
majority’s articulation of the general contours of due process has any 
substantial effect on the Court’s deliberations in the next case that comes 
along?  Doesn’t his own work demonstrate that his proposal is essentially an 
 
 5. Id. at 431-32. 
 6. Id. at 432. 
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improbable wish for the world to be quite different from what it really is, quite 
different from what his own work demonstrates it to be? 
Regardless whether Professor Israel’s concluding thought is meant to be 
taken seriously or is instead merely an engaging way to end an article 
effectively demonstrating that the aspiration of the thought is not likely ever to 
be accomplished, there lurk interesting questions here concerning the 
analytical tools that Professor Israel is employing and whether they are 
appropriate to the task he has set himself. 
Whether intended or not, Professor Israel is reflecting the widely and 
strongly felt desire for certainty and predictability in the law, and his article, 
viewed at least from the lens of his concluding section, is a disappointed search 
for those variables in the Court’s treatment of the due process clause, taking 
the cases as a whole.  The ideal culmination of his search would be the 
articulation of an algorithm that permits results under the due process clause to 
be deduced from a defined set of premises, thus imparting certainty and 
predictability to the process.  Interestingly, Professor Israel comments from 
time to time on the role of deduction in the Court’s opinions, although he does 
not develop the point or place it in context with other tools of reasoning.7  In 
any event, Professor Israel’s approach is an example of the standard 
idealization of law, at least by those in the profession in touch with the 
operation of the legal system and the practice of law for whom certainty and 
predictability are critical.  Add in legitimate sources of the premises, and one 
has the essence of the standard version of the rule of law: Authoritative 
statements of clear rules by legitimate lawgivers that can be applied in a 
straightforward, predictable fashion. 
By referring to these matters as idealizations, I mean them no disrespect.  
Certainty and predictability are important variables in life.  Any legal system 
constructed in the afterglow of the Enlightenment and dedicated to the liberal 
conception of government as serving the private interests of the citizenship will 
have at its core the aspiration for clear and definite articulation of rights and 
obligations by duly constituted authorities.  Certainty and predictability allow 
individuals to protect their interests and plan their lives, to flourish.  My guess 
is that the desire for certainty and predictability goes even deeper and is hard-
wired into the brain, for it has real survival value.  If the village’s children 
wander down to the riverbank and get eaten by alligators, the villagers’ genes 
will soon die out unless a quite certain rule is quickly put into place: “Stay 
away from the riverbank.” 
Professor Israel is, I think, lamenting the lack of certainty and 
predictability in the Supreme Court’s due process cases.  But certainty and 
predictability come at a price.  If the only source of food or water for the 
villagers is the river and its fish, the rule that protects them from destruction by 
 
 7. Id. at 371-73. 
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alligators assures them of destruction by famine and thirst.  To come at an 
acceptable cost, rules often have to be tailored to the occasion.  And some 
occasions call for rules of a different sort than the deductive one implicitly at 
the heart of Professor Israel’s critique of the Court.  Suppose the villagers 
needed water or fish from the river to survive.  They would do well to adopt a 
rule to the effect: “Approach the river with great care, preferably in an open 
area during daylight, and be sure to be on guard for anything suggesting 
danger, although we can’t specify in advance exactly all the dangerous signs.  
In fact, as you learn what some of them are, please keep us informed.”  This 
rule has some certain and predictable elements, some of which require the 
exercise of judgment, and some that ask for corrective feedback. 
Generalize this.  There are always at least two questions that inform 
analysis, and thus legal regulation, of any kind.  One, to focus just on 
regulation as a subset of analysis, is the nature of the thing being regulated; the 
other is how well the tools available for the regulation might work, given the 
nature of the thing to be regulated.  An object or field to be regulated may be 
simple and straightforward, or it may be complex and unpredictable.  Tools of 
regulation range from simple, straightforward, deductively applied commands 
or proscriptions, to unconstrained discretion or letting nature take its course, 
with many way stations in between, such as discretion within varying degrees 
of constraint, indirect versus direct influences (moral sanctions versus tax 
incentives versus criminal penalties, for example), rules versus standards 
versus principles and so on. 
Another variable relevant to intelligent choice about regulation is the 
appropriate conception of the thing to be regulated.  What is the appropriate 
level of abstraction?  What are the salient parameters of the problem?  What 
needs immediate attention, and why?  And, what can be set aside for the 
moment?  The conceptual point is sometimes largely independent of the two 
variables discussed in the previous paragraph, as in much of mathematics, for 
example, but sometimes largely a restatement of them, as is probably the case 
with the explanation of “due process” that is Professor Israel’s task.  These 
various points standardly get jumbled up in the law because there are no 
obvious “natural kinds” in quite the same way that lions, walruses and water 
molecules exist; the order to the law is conventional, not natural.8  Choices of 
the proper conceptual level to enter into a problem thus have to be made; they 
are not given to us by nature. 
Perhaps Professor Israel would not agree.  He has chosen to analyze the 
due process clause as though it were a natural kind, rather than simply a 
convention marking a place and a set of practices in a set of conventions, that 
 
 8. Some would disagree.  Natural rights lawyers would, for example, as probably would a 
believer in moral reality.  The objects of law, people for example, may very well be natural kinds, 
of course. 
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can be examined in its own right in much the same way that a biologist 
interested in lions need not be concerned with the physical properties of water 
molecules.  Perhaps Professor Israel does not think that the due process clause 
is a natural kind like lions, recognizes it as a conventional concept, but 
nonetheless thinks that his choice may be the most convenient and fruitful 
working hypothesis.  In either case, another interesting question is exposed.  
To combine the questions of natural kinds and fruitful working hypotheses into 
one, that question is whether the due process clause can be studied not only 
independently of the historical and political variables that Professor Israel 
explicitly has put aside but also independently of the rest of the Constitution of 
which it is a part.  Professor Israel spends some time on the relationships 
between the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the 
provisions of the Bill of Rights, both the particularized ones and the Fifth 
Amendment’s own due process clause, but he spends no time at all on any 
other relationship outside of these parameters.  For example, he does not 
address questions of federalism or separation powers, nor does he examine 
matters of institutional competence such as the limits of the adversarial process 
and the relative capacity of different institutions to engage in systematic 
studies of problem areas. 
Bring all these points together with the following thought experiment.  
Suppose instead of analyzing due process in the search for its legal verities, 
Professor Israel had engaged in the quite different project of attempting to 
specify the nature of due process adjudication over time.  He might plausibly 
have formulated his hypothesis thusly: 
If due process is a natural kind with defined parameters, is not just a 
convention, and is comprised of a defined set of problems whose solutions can 
be reduced to manageably sized sets of necessary and sufficient conditions, 
and if the Supreme Court is strongly dedicated to the rule of law 
conventionally conceived, then I predict that I will find a relatively clear 
articulation of the meaning of the due process clause that will persist 
reasonably well over time.  If some or all of this is false, I predict I will find a 
set of explanations of the meaning of due process that are not orderly in any 
obvious way and that cannot plausibly be reduced to rule-like form. 
To finish the thought experiment, and in the spirit of Professor Israel’s 
hypothetical Supreme Court opinion, attach this experimental hypothesis to the 
beginning of Professor Israel’s article, detach the last section, “The Lessons of 
History,” and replace it with a newly entitled section, “Discussion.”  What 
would be the contents of the discussion section?  It might go something like 
this: 
Having examined the entire range of the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on 
due process in criminal cases, the strong hypothesis that “due process” 
constitutes a natural kind that can be characterized in terms of manageably 
sized sets of necessary and sufficient conditions and is so employed by a 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2001] THE LESSONS OF HISTORY 473 
Supreme Court with a strong commitment to the conventional view of the rule 
of law has been disconfirmed.  No positive thesis has been confirmed, 
however.  The explanation for our findings may reside in any of the variables, 
or in some interaction of them.  For example, “due process” may constitute a 
natural kind, but the Court may not be committed to the conventional idea of 
the rule of law.  Alternatively, the Court may be committed to the conventional 
idea of the rule of law, but the subject matter encompassed by the phrase “due 
process” may extend over too vast a landscape to permit usable generalizations 
to emerge.  Which of these possibilities, or many other similar ones that we 
have not specifically articulated, is the case will have to be determined by 
future work. 
This indicates to me that in addition to providing a definitive cataloguing 
of the relevant cases, Professor Israel has made another contribution by 
outlining the direction future scholarship should go.  He identifies one possible 
explanation for the unpredictability of interpretations of the due process 
clause—changing majorities on the Court—and that is certainly one variable 
that needs study.9  He also mentions in passing “political and social 
developments” as one possible explanation of the data, and he is again surely 
right that this is in need of further study.  The adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was not just, and not even mainly, a juridical act akin to the 
passing of a statute; it recognized in part the changes that had been wrought by 
a civil war, a “non-constitutional” event that profoundly modified 
constitutional relationships.  And of course interpretive theories are not 
themselves provided in the Constitution, and this is yet another matter that 
bears on the interpretation of the due process clause. 
There are other issues that need attention as well.  I very much doubt that 
interpretations of the due process clause could ever be captured by a general 
theory that would be politically acceptable.  Due process claims can be raised 
about virtually any aspect of the criminal process.  They are context dependent, 
and the contexts vary dramatically both case to case within a jurisdiction and 
over the various jurisdictions in which due process claims can be raised.  Any 
general theory would thus have to encompass such a large number of variables 
as to be, literally, computationally intractable.  Ross Rosenberg and I have 
given an extended discussion of this in an area that is structurally analogous—
 
 9. Although the outcome of such studies are not preordained.  Most observers predicted 
that the changes from the Warren Court to the Burger and then Rehnquist Courts would produce 
dramatic change in constitutional law, and in particular in those areas dealing with the criminal 
process.  The consensus today is that the effects of changing membership are not nearly so strong 
as previously believed.  See generally THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT 
WASN’T (Vince Blasi ed., 1983). 
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the Fourth Amendment10—and if anything, what goes by the term “due 
process” is even more variegated.  In large measure, in fact, Professor Israel 
has replicated our findings concerning the Fourth Amendment in the due 
process context (whether he subscribes to our analysis of what is found or not).  
In any event, the extension of the term “due process” is also unpredictable, 
which is another variable that makes algorithmic, rule-like approaches to 
problems generally unsatisfactory.  The unpredictability comes from many 
sources, including the grand sociopolitical changes Professor Israel notices but 
puts aside, but also from the ever-changing milieu at the bottom of the 
process—the realities of crime, investigation and trial at the street level, as it 
were. 
Although Professor Israel identified, but did not examine, one variable that 
increases the unpredictability of due process adjudication—changing 
membership on the Court—he fails to address the astonishing complexity 
involved.  This can be considered on many levels.  Take what some may think 
is the simplest task—ensuring doctrinal consistency.  Professor Israel must cite 
more than 100 cases in his article.  To ensure consistency in a set of cases 
requires, at a minimum, the comparison of each case to all the others.  To 
check the consistency of cases on the assumption that each case could be right 
or wrong by comparison to every other case would require 2100 comparisons.  
And of course “right or wrong” does not capture our view of cases—
sometimes they are partially right and partially wrong.  Moreover, there is 
often disagreement about what a case stands for, how to read concurring 
opinions, the implications of dissents, and so forth, all of which complicate the 
matter further. 
Consider just a few of the complicating variables.  Opinions issue to hold 
together tenuous coalitions, but the opinions surely do not capture all the 
thinking of every person who signs on to the opinion.  Thus, the next case may 
look a lot like the previous one, but critically different to one of the members 
of the first majority.  If the first case was 5-to-4, perhaps the next will be 5-to-4 
but apparently in the opposite direction, creating an appearance of 
inconsistency.  The appearance, though, is false; the reality is that a new 
variable has been introduced in the decision-making process.  Similarly, often 
the articulated ground of decision in cases is not a single variable, whether it is 
the “independent meaning of due process” or something else.  As Professor 
Israel recognizes, Griffin v. Illinois11 is as much about equal protection as it is 
due process, yet contains no algorithm to separate the two.  Many of the cases 
 
 10. See generally Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, The Fourth Amendment and the 
Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149 
(1998). 
 11. 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
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he cites hold that there is no due process violation, such as in Betts v. Brady.12  
Is it obvious that such cases are informative on the positive meaning of “due 
process”?  Professor Israel identifies many variables that have been taken into 
account by the cases, and he also provides syntheses of these variables by 
various commentators, yet nowhere is there any indication of how the variables 
interact, which adds yet another layer of complexity.  Suppose historical 
practice implies one thing, yet institutional competence, separation of power, 
or federalism another.  How is the interaction to be worked out? 
Even such a “simple” thing as original intent, if that could somehow be 
demonstrated to be the polestar of constitutional decision, is deeply 
problematic in certain respects.  I won’t repeat here the numerous arguments 
over what original intent might mean and the equally numerous arguments 
about its justification as the centerpiece of constitutional decision.  Assume 
you know what it means and that it is the centerpiece.  Now answer the 
following question: Employing “original intent” as the proper authoritative 
principle, does the Fourth Amendment, or the due process clause, or both, or 
whatever, regulate wiretapping?  No one at the time the Fourth Amendment 
was adopted was thinking about wiretapping for a rather obvious reason: 
Virtually no one was thinking about electricity.  I know of no evidence 
suggesting that anyone was thinking of wiretapping as a constitutional issue 
when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified either.  And for that matter, how 
about thermal imaging, which is now before the Supreme Court?13  Applying 
originalism to issues never conceived of by whomever the appropriate 
founding generation may be is no mean feat.  Does the failure to think of 
wiretapping mean it is completely unregulated by the Fourth Amendment?  
Does it mean that the right to be free from wiretapping is a right “reserved to 
the people?” 
None of these questions have algorithmic answers.  Their answers emerge 
as a consequence of a process.  In my view, Professor Israel’s major 
contribution is that it is yet another demonstration of the grip that the 
adversarial, common law process has on American lawmaking.  The Court 
does not appear to be searching for grand, top-down theories—at least so far as 
its actions as compared to its words are concerned—to superimpose over the 
enormously complicated messiness of the criminal justice process.  It is instead 
attending to the arguments of the parties over time in widely disparate areas in 
which it has no particular expertise, and reaching its best judgment on the 
merits of each case it hears.  There may be tension, real or imagined, between 
the Court’s view of the merits in one case and its view of the merits in another, 
but that is only a problem if for some reason such tension is illegitimate.  But, 
what is the basis of the illegitimacy?  Where does it say that the Constitution is 
 
 12. 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942). 
 13. Kyllo v. United States, No. 99-8508, 2000 U.S. LEXIS 4863 (granting writ of certiorari). 
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only to be interpreted through grand, top-down theories to be applied 
deductively?  Indeed, isn’t the existence of the adversarial/common law 
tradition, a tradition preceding the enactment of any part of the Constitution 
and continuing today, quite to the contrary?  There is no incoherence in 
looking at problems locally rather than as points in a vast, all-inclusive theory.  
To be sure, there is a problem for those who claim that the only appropriate 
form of constitutional adjudication involves general theories, but again, on 
what is that based?  And what is the basis for thinking that general theories 
would be pragmatically better in any event?  General theories generally come 
out badly over time precisely because of their lack of responsiveness to the real 
world around them.  Separate but equal comes to mind, as does the phrase 
“consistent with the letter but not the spirit of the law.” 
I suspect that the readers of this symposium will come across numerous 
general theories in the comments on Professor Israel’s article of what due 
process adjudication “should entail,” and what theory or theories the Court 
“should” embrace.  The promotion of general theories will surely have many 
sources.  Some of it will come from the deeply ingrained attraction for rules I 
discussed earlier.  It also comes from academics who would have the Court 
impose their idiosyncratic political and social views on the rest of us without 
having to bother with the democratic process.  In the end, this will reduce to 
commentators plugging for their pet theories, but without the responsibility for 
their actions that a real political actor possesses, and without the theory being 
tested through the adversarial process by the individuals directly affected by it.  
Needless to say, I would guess, I think most of those theories should remain as 
academic exercises.  The picture that Professor Israel has painted is not one 
that causes me, or should cause anyone except disappointed academics, to 
despair.  To the contrary, it is a picture of a vibrant, organic process that 
evolves in the face of new problems.  In most walks of life, the choices are 
evolve or stagnate.  I suspect this one is no different. 
 
